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I. INTRODUCTION
In two recent cases, Montejo v. Louisiana1 and Maryland v. Shatzer,2 the
Supreme Court has held, for the first time, that overt custodial government contact
with a represented criminal defendant after the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
has attached, initiated by law enforcement agents for the purpose of securing a
Miranda waiver and obtaining a statement and without the consent or presence of the
defendant’s lawyer, is constitutional in certain circumstances. This change in the
constitutional landscape has serious implications for the interpretation and
enforcement of one of the bedrock rules of professional responsibility: the rule that
lawyers are forbidden from making contact with represented adverse parties.3 It
forces the question: Should the ethics rules be aligned with the constitutional rules in
criminal cases? And if they diverge, can prosecutors effectively manage their
investigations when key investigatory tactics are lawful for police but forbidden for
prosecutors?
In the parallel context of undercover investigations, in which prosecutors direct
undercover agents to elicit incriminating statements from represented defendants, the
courts have uniformly interpreted the no-contact rule to allow for undercover
contacts prior to the initiation of adverse judicial proceedings and the attachment of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. But no court, commentator, or committee
has ever announced or proposed such a rule for overt contacts. Before Montejo and
Shatzer, there was no need to consider the question because the Miranda rules4
tracked the ethical rules by way of Michigan v. Jackson.5 But things have now
changed. Jackson has been overruled, and Montejo and Shatzer force us to
reconsider the standard analyses of the constitutional and ethical norms governing
the following four scenarios, as applied to police and to prosecutors:
1)

In systems—paradigmatically, federal court—in which counsel is
appointed for defendants at their initial appearance, but the Sixth
Amendment does not attach until an indictment or information is filed
(up to thirty days later), may law enforcement custodially contact the
defendant, post-appointment but pre-attachment, without counsel
present, in the attempt to get a Miranda waiver, so long as the defendant
has not invoked a right to counsel in a Miranda setting?

And may a prosecutor ethically direct or supervise agents in so doing?
2)

May law enforcement custodially contact a represented criminal
defendant post-attachment, where the defendant has been appointed
counsel at an initial appearance but has not invoked his right to counsel
in a Miranda setting?

1

Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2086 (2009).

2

Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1222 (2010).

3

MODEL RULES
every state code).

OF

PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2009) (enacted more or less verbatim in

4

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471-72 (1966).

5

Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986).
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And may a prosecutor ethically direct or supervise agents in so doing?
3)

May law enforcement custodially contact a defendant, pre-attachment,
in the attempt to get a Miranda waiver, where the defendant has invoked
his right to counsel in a Miranda setting but has then been released from
custody for two weeks?

And may a prosecutor ethically direct or supervise agents in so doing?
4)

May law enforcement custodially contact a defendant, post-attachment,
in the attempt to get a Miranda waiver, where the defendant has invoked
his right to counsel in a Miranda setting but has then been released from
custody for two weeks?

And may a prosecutor ethically direct or supervise agents in so doing?
In this paper, I examine the consequences of the divergence of ethical and
constitutional rules, with particular attention to the institutional dynamics of criminal
investigation and specifically the relationship between police and prosecutors. This
relationship is of crucial importance because Montejo and Shatzer create a legal
regime in which non-lawyer agents and officers may initiate investigative contact
with represented defendants in circumstances in which prosecutors are absolutely
forbidden to do so. This situation undermines the ability of prosecutors to
effectively supervise the investigation of their cases and puts them in an untenable
position when advising agents on the law.
In Part II of this paper, I set out the facts and holdings of the new cases. In Part
III, I explain the scope and limits of the no-contact ethics rule as applied to criminal
investigations. In Part IV, I apply the constitutional and ethical rules to four specific
investigatory scenarios to show how the legal limits on police and prosecutorial
investigations diverge. In Part V, I examine the potential consequences of divergent
rules for police and prosecutors on permissible investigative methods. In Part VI, I
consider the likely practical consequences of the new cases for defendants. I
conclude that rather than lower the ethical bar for prosecutors, prosecuting agencies
should raise the bar for their agents: Prosecutors should instruct their agents not to
make Montejo/Shatzer contacts with defendants and should commit to a policy of
not using any Montejo/Shatzer statements nonetheless obtained by law enforcement.
Such a policy—already endorsed by the Justice Department for federal agents6—is, I
think, necessary to maintain the integrity of the adversarial process, which is
necessary for maintaining the social legitimacy of law enforcement.

6

See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Overruling Michigan v.
Jackson at 11-12, Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009) (No. 07-1529), 2009 WL
1019983 (stating that federal agents are unlikely to engage in Montejo contacts even if the
Court allows them). Of course, that’s just the Solicitor General’s prediction. How the
agencies’ internal guidelines develop is a different matter—as are the informal practice norms
that may develop.
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II. THE NEW CASES
A. Montejo
Jesse Montejo shot and killed Jerry Ferrari.7 Louisiana police investigating the
murder arrested Montejo and read him his Miranda rights.8 Montejo waived his
rights and agreed to answer questions.9 He admitted shooting Ferrari and said he had
thrown the gun into a lake.10 Two days later he was brought to court for his initial
appearance.11 The court appointed counsel for Montejo, who was then returned to
jail.12 Before Montejo had met the lawyer who had been appointed for him, two
detectives came to his cell and asked if he would be willing to show them where the
murder weapon was.13 The detectives again read Montejo his Miranda rights, which
he again waived. He agreed to go with the detectives to find the gun.14 “During the
excursion, he wrote an inculpatory letter of apology to the victim’s widow.”15 The
government introduced the letter at trial, over the objection that it had been obtained
through a Miranda waiver obtained without counsel, after counsel had been
appointed.16
The Louisiana courts held that because Montejo had never expressly invoked his
right to counsel, the post-appointment waiver was valid and the letter was
admissible.17 The court distinguished Michigan v. Jackson, which had held that
post-appointment waivers were presumed invalid where the defendant had requested
counsel at an initial court appearance.18 Under Louisiana procedure, the court
reasoned, the defendant never requests anything; counsel is automatically
appointed.19 Therefore there was no invocation, and no Edwards bar on police reinitiation of contact.20
Montejo argued in the Supreme Court that the Jackson presumption of invalidity
should be triggered by the fact that he had a lawyer, not by whether he had explicitly
requested one.21 It would be irrational, he urged, to draw such an important
7

Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2082.

8

Id.

9

Id.

10

Id.

11

Id.

12

Id.

13

Id.

14

Id.

15

Id.

16

Id. at 2083.

17

Id.

18

Id.

19

Id.

20

Id.

21

Id. at 2084.
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constitutional distinction on the basis of the minutiae of state appointment hearing
colloquies.22 Whether the hearing judge said, “Now Mr. Defendant, do you want a
lawyer?” (as the colloquy runs in Michigan), or “Now Mr. Defendant, I’m
appointing a lawyer to represent you” (as the colloquy runs in Louisiana), the
relevant fact, he argued, is surely that, as of that moment, the defendant has a
lawyer.23
The protection of Jackson—the presumptive invalidity of postappointment waivers—should not vary state to state based on the seemingly
irrelevant turn of phrase employed by courts; surely the relevant fact is the
appointment itself.24
The Supreme Court agreed with Montejo that it would be irrational to apply
Jackson based on the grammatical nuance of the state appointment procedures.25 Its
solution, however, was not to reverse his conviction, but rather to overrule Jackson
and throw out the entire concept of a presumption of invalidity for post-appointment
waivers.26
The Court’s reasoning was simple: Miranda rights can be waived, and the
government may continue to seek a waiver until the suspect actually invokes his
rights.27
When a court appoints counsel for an indigent defendant in the absence of
any request on his part, there is no basis for a presumption that any
subsequent waiver of the right to counsel will be involuntary. There is no
“initial election” to exercise the right . . . that must be preserved through a
prophylactic rule against later waivers. No reason exists to assume that a
defendant like Montejo, who has done nothing at all to express his
intentions with respect to his Sixth Amendment rights, would not be
perfectly amenable to speaking with the police without having counsel
present. And no reason exists to prohibit the police from inquiring.28
Additionally, the initial appearance cannot count as a Miranda right-to-counsel
invocation, the Court held, because a right-to-counsel invocation can only be made
“when the defendant is approached for interrogation.”29 Miranda rights, said the
Court, cannot be invoked “anticipatorily.”30 Therefore the Edwards presumption of
invalidity for post-invocation waivers should not be extended to post-appointment
22

Id.

23

Id. at 2085.

24

Id.

25

Id.

26

Id. at 2091.

27

Invocation of the right to silence requires the police to stop questioning, wait for a
decent interval, then re-Mirandize when they re-start questioning. See Michigan v. Mosley,
423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975). Invocation of the right to counsel required (at the time Montejo was
decided—things are different now, after Shatzer!) the police to stop questioning entirely until
the defendant’s counsel was present. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981).
28

Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2087.

29

Id. at 2091.

30

Id.
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waivers, because nothing that happens at the appointment hearing should be
interpreted as an invocation of the right to have counsel present during questioning.
We have in fact never held that a person can invoke his Miranda rights
anticipatorily, in a context other than “custodial interrogation.” . . . What
matters for Miranda and Edwards is what happens when the defendant is
approached for interrogation, and (if he consents) what happens during
the interrogation—not what happened at any preliminary hearing.31
In sum, until a suspect has invoked his right to counsel to a law-enforcement
officer in response to a request for a Miranda waiver, law-enforcement officers may
initiate contact to secure the suspect’s cooperation.
B. Shatzer
Michael Shatzer was in prison for sexual assault.32 While he was serving his
sentence, detectives received information about another crime he was alleged to have
committed.33 They went to the prison, brought Shatzer to an interview room, and
read him his Miranda rights.34 He invoked his right to counsel, and the detectives
ended the interview and left.35 Ending the interview was the correct action under the
Edwards rule, which provides that a suspect’s invocation of the Miranda right to
counsel requires termination of questioning until counsel is present.36 Under
Edwards, unless the suspect re-initiates the interview, any subsequent Miranda
waiver will be presumed invalid.37
Shatzer was not charged with the second offense, so a lawyer was not appointed
for him.38 More than two years later, while Shatzer was still in prison on the original
offense, the detectives received more information about the alleged second crime.39
They returned to the prison, brought Shatzer to an interview room, and read him his
Miranda rights.40 This time Shatzer waived his rights and made an incriminating
statement.41 He was charged with the second crime, and the statement was admitted
against him, over his objection that it had been obtained in violation of the Edwards

31

Id.

32

Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1217 (2010).

33

Id.

34

Id.

35

Id.

36

Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981).

37

Id.

38

Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1218.

39

Id.

40

Id.

41

Id.
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rule.42 The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed under Edwards, and the State
appealed.43
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding for the first time that the
Edwards presumption of invalidity for a post-invocation waiver of the right to
counsel has a time limit of two weeks, if the suspect has been out of custody.44
When . . . a suspect [who has invoked his right to counsel] has been
released from his pretrial custody and has returned to his normal life for
some time before the later attempted interrogation, there is little reason to
think that his change of heart regarding interrogation without counsel has
been coerced. He has no longer been isolated. He has likely been able to
seek advice from an attorney, family members, and friends.45
The Court’s reasoning is thus that the initial presumption of coercion engendered
by the experience of custodial interrogation can dissipate over time, and when it has
dissipated, the rationale for the prophylactic Edwards rule no longer applies.
The Court’s explanation for why two weeks is sufficient is less clear. While the
Shatzer case itself involved a two-year interval, the Court chose not to decide the
case on its facts. Instead, it held that two weeks is “plenty of time.”46 The Court
invoked the common criminal procedure theme that law enforcement officers need
clear rules to follow and asserted that it would be “impractical” to leave the precise
duration of the Edwards limitations period to case-by-case litigation.47 So the Court
had to pick a number, and two weeks was the winner.48 It is impractical to leave the
42

Id.

43

Id.

44
Id. at 1223. The Court also held, interestingly though not relevant to this Article, that
Shatzer was constructively “out of custody” during the intervening two years, because he was
returned to the general prison population, and was in prison on another conviction. Thus,
while he was confined, he was not in custody based on the alleged second offense. Id. at
1216.
45

Id. at 1221.

46

Id. at 1223.

47

Id. at 1222.

48

Professor Kerr commented wryly at the time:

As a matter of policy, I think that’s a pretty good rule. But why precisely 14 days?
That is, 336 hours, or exactly 20,160 minutes? There is no 14-day Clause in the
Constitution. (I checked.) Why not 15 days? Or 13.491 days? As far as I can guess,
the only reason 14 days was chosen is that it’s easy to remember and seemed in the
right ballpark. Jews started measuring seven days as a time period in the 6th Century
BC; the Romans then adopted it, measuring time in 7-day weeks; and two-thousandodd years later, on February 24, 2010, a majority of the Justices on the Supreme Court
thought that one of those was too short, three was too long, and two seemed about
right. And how did the Justices know that 14 days would be about right? Based on
their extensive experience being arrested, perhaps? Presumably not. But no matter.
Fourteen days seemed about right, and so the 14-day rule became the law.
Orin Kerr, Does the Constitution Have a 14-Day Clause?, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 25, 2010,
11:45 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/02/does-the-constitution-have-a-14-day-clause/.
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answer to that question for clarification in future case-by-case adjudication; law
enforcement officers need to know, with certainty and beforehand, when renewed
interrogation is lawful.49 “It seems to us that period is 14 days. That provides plenty
of time for the suspect to get reacclimated to his normal life, to consult with friends
and counsel, and to shake off any residual coercive effects of his prior custody.”50
Shatzer thus complements Montejo. While Montejo applies to represented
defendants who have not invoked their right to counsel when asked to waive it,
Shatzer applies to those who have invoked it, and its holding is easily summarized:
When can you re-approach? If you let the guy go free51 and wait two weeks, then rearrest him.
C. Restatement of the New Rule
Here, in sum, is the jurisprudential significance of these cases: Montejo wipes out
Jackson and pushes the analysis to Edwards. Then Shatzer announces a two-week
limit on Edwards. This is a big change.
Montejo holds that the Sixth Amendment can be validly waived, post-attachment,
by a represented defendant, without the knowledge of the defendant’s lawyer.52
Montejo emphatically rejects the claim that the fact of representation is relevant to
the validity of the waiver. Montejo overrules Jackson and holds that Edwards
provides sufficient protection for defendants invoking the right to counsel.53
Edwards, not the fact of attachment or of representation, is the source of any
prohibition on contact.
Shatzer then dramatically limits Edwards, holding that the post-invocation
prohibition on government-initiated contact lasts only two weeks.54 So combining
the two holdings, we reach the following restatement: (1) the fact of representation is
irrelevant to the validity of an uncounseled waiver; (2) the fact of Sixth Amendment
attachment is irrelevant to the validity of an uncounseled waiver; (3) Edwards
supplies the limits on government waiver requests; and (4) Edwards is now limited
to two weeks, so the government can renew an uncounseled custodial waiver request
post-invocation after a two-week period of release from custody.
In short, after two weeks of freedom, a Shatzer defendant is identically situated
to a Montejo defendant. Under Montejo, the government may initiate uncounseled,
custodial, post-attachment contact with a represented defendant to seek a waiver,
unless there’s an Edwards bar. And under Shatzer, the Edwards bar lapses after two
weeks. Thus, after two weeks of freedom, a post-attachment defendant who has
invoked and acquired counsel can be re-arrested,55 and then re-approached by the
government in an attempt to secure a waiver.
49

Id.

50

Id.

51

The case may also be a release back to the general population.

52

See supra Part II.A.

53

Id.

54

See supra text accompanying note 44.

55

This is assuming probable cause, obviously. But that’s no big hurdle after Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (pretextual arrest permissible if based on probable cause)
and Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (arrest for minor traffic violation
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So does this mean that even when a defendant invokes his right to counsel, if
there is a long period between charge and trial, and the defendant is out on bail, the
government can re-arrest him every two weeks, and then, without his lawyer, ask if
he wants to talk? Yes, it does, as a constitutional matter. The more difficult
question is whether the prosecutor, as an ethical matter, can participate.
III. THE NO-CONTACT RULE
A. Background
The no-contact rule has been part of every formal code of legal ethics since the
nineteenth century.56 It provides that a lawyer cannot knowingly communicate about
a matter with a person who the lawyer knows (or should know) is represented in that
matter by another lawyer.57 It is found, in almost verbatim language, in every state
ethics code, which apply to federal as well as state prosecutors; by statute, federal
prosecutors are covered by the state rules in any district where they practice.58
There is, however, one major exception: Contacts are permitted if they are
“authorized by law.”59 Among the contacts uniformly held to be authorized by law
are undercover investigatory contacts initiated by prosecutors where the target has
not yet been indicted.60 In this respect, the ethics rule exception tracks the limits of
the Sixth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment prohibits the deliberate elicitation of
incriminating statements from criminal defendants after the right to counsel has
attached, which is at either indictment (in federal prosecutions) or some earlier point
permissible under Fourth Amendment). One would imagine it going down like this: You get
the guy on one charge; he invokes and makes bail. So you wait two weeks, follow him until
he violates a traffic law, then arrest him, get him back in the interrogation room, and try again.
Can you do that? Shatzer says yes, you can. See Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1223. Of course, if he
invokes again, you have to stop. There’s still no badgering allowed. See Montejo, 129 S. Ct.
at 2090. But if you’re polite, you can repeat the scenario every two weeks. Pretext is
permissible. If the guy runs a stop sign, you can bring him in.
56
See generally John Leubsdorf, Communicating with Another Lawyer’s Client: The
Lawyer’s Veto and the Client’s Interest, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 683, 684 (1979) (tracing the rule
to an 1836 treatise).
57

See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2009).

58

The McDade Amendment, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2006), subjects federal
attorneys to the ethics rules of the state where they practice. For pre-McDade Amendment
regulations, see Communications with Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,910 (Aug. 4,
1994) (providing DOJ regulation exempting Department attorneys from state and federal court
rules prohibiting contacts with represented persons) (replaced by Ethical Standards for
Attorneys for the Government, 64 Fed. Reg. 19,273 (Apr. 20, 1999) (to be codified at 28
C.F.R. pt. 77)).
59

For example, Rule 4.2 of the Model Rules provides:

In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the
representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in
the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do
so by law or a court order.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2009).
60

See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 595 F.3d 498, 515 (3d Cir. 2010) (collecting cases).
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(in most state prosecutions) that marks the beginning of “formal adversarial
proceedings.”61 Under Massiah v. United States,62 pre-attachment undercover
investigations, including those directed by prosecutors, are permissible, and the
ethics rules track that holding.63 Thus there is neither a constitutional nor an ethical
reason why prosecutors should not direct and supervise agents in making undercover
contact with represented criminal suspects, so long as the suspects have not been
indicted.
Because the Sixth Amendment protection for defendants begins at indictment (or
the equivalent state procedure), pre-indictment, overt contact by law enforcement is
constitutionally permissible.64 Several courts have held that the no-contact
prohibition “entifies” (comes into being) at the moment the Sixth Amendment
attaches.65 No attachment, no ethical prohibition. Other courts have held that the
no-contact rule attaches at the time of representation and thus is in force preattachment.66 In either event, though, certain contacts might still be “authorized by
law.” Thus, for example, the Third Circuit held pre-attachment, undercover contacts
to be “authorized by law” even under the Pennsylvania rule, which does apply preattachment.67
In jurisdictions where the no-contact obligation only entifies at attachment,
prosecutors are placed in an ethical position different from all other attorneys: They
are permitted to contact represented defendants because (as a legal fiction) there is as
61

See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).

62

Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).

63

See, e.g., United States v. Powe, 9 F.3d 68, 69 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The duty to avoid ex
parte contacts does not apply to pre-indictment, noncustodial conversations with a suspect.”);
State v. Lang, 702 A.2d 135 (Vt. 1997) (“[T]he rule has an exception for communications
authorized by law, and we believe it applies to these undercover operations.”).
64

Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688.

65

See United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1460 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The prosecutor’s
ethical duty to refrain from contacting represented defendants entifies upon indictment for the
same reasons that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches.”); United States v. Balter,
91 F.3d 427, 436 (3d Cir. 1996) (construing New Jersey’s ethics rules and holding that “[b]y
its terms, Rule 4.2 applies to a ‘party’ represented in a ‘matter.’ . . . [A] criminal suspect is
not a ‘party’ until ‘after formal legal or adversarial proceedings are commenced.’ . . .
Moreover, even if a criminal suspect were a ‘party’ within the meaning of the Rule, preindictment investigation by prosecutors is precisely the type of contact exempted from the
Rule as ‘authorized by law.’” (internal citations omitted)).
66

For example, Minnesota courts interpret the rule to apply pre-attachment. See State v.
Miller, 600 N.W.2d 457, 467 (Minn. 1999).
[B]ecause the interests protected by MRPC 4.2 and the constitutional protections
relating to an individual’s right to counsel are fundamentally different, there is no
rational basis to conclude that the application of the protection afforded should
necessarily be coextensive. Thus we do not perceive that the application of MRPC 4.2
should be limited, in a criminal context, to contacts with an attorney’s client after the
client has been charged.
Miller, 600 N.W.2d at 467.
67

See United States v. Brown, 595 F.3d 498, 516 (3d Cir. 2010).
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yet no “matter”; the “matter,” under these cases, is the formal charge, not the
investigation. This distinction is unique to the criminal context: In no other litigation
context does the obligation not to contact a represented party depend on whether
there are formal judicial proceedings underway. Commentators and defense
attorneys have complained about this, of course. One defense attorney wrote:
This disparate treatment of “parties” not yet indicted or charged in
criminal cases is unfair, undermines the policy behind [Rule] 4.2 and
demonstrates a cynical view of defense counsel’s role in the criminal
justice system. . . . [T]he government’s legitimate right to investigate
suspected crimes should not trump [Rule] 4.2’s policy of protecting
parties from overzealous lawyers, preserving the integrity of the attorneyclient relationship, preventing the inadvertent disclosure of privileged
information and facilitating settlement. All lawyers owe the same duties
under the ethical rules no matter whom they represent or how legitimate
their litigation goals.68
He points out that in civil litigation, the pre-filing period, when most settlements are
worked out, is obviously and necessarily subject to the rule.69 Why then, he asks, not
also in criminal cases, in which pre-attachment settlements (depending, of course, on
the jurisdiction’s attachment rules) are also the norm? The case law, however, is
generally to the contrary: Criminal investigations are different.70
B. What Does “Authorized by Law” Mean?
The no-contact rule forbids contacts with represented defendants, but expressly
allows contacts that are “authorized by law.”71 There is no dispute that
Montejo/Shatzer contacts are directed at represented persons, nor that the contacts
concern the subject matter of the representation. Thus, the only question is whether
they should be considered “authorized by law.” The rule does not create those
authorizations; it incorporates those created by other sources of law. The Model
Rules commentary, for example, states that contacts authorized by law “include
constitutionally permissible investigative activities of lawyers representing
68
Lawrence Palles, Submitted Prosecutors Should Be Forbidden from Contacting Parties
Ex Parte When Those Parties Are Represented by Counsel and Not Charged with Criminal
Offenses, ARIZ. ATT’Y, June 2005, at 41, 42.
69

Id. at 46.

70

Although, in what looks like an outlier with somewhat unusual facts, the Minnesota
Supreme Court held in Miller that the no-contact rule was violated when government
attorneys who had been involved in a civil investigation of a corporation and its management,
in which they had communicated only through the defendant’s counsel, then opened a
criminal investigation and immediately interviewed defendants without counsel present.
Miller, 600 N.W.2d at 468.
[T]he question is whether there is a rational basis to conclude that a change in the
nature of the investigation from civil to criminal justifies allowing the prosecutor’s
contact with appellant as “authorized by law,” when contact was clearly prohibited by
MRPC 4.2 when the proceeding was civil in nature. We believe there is none.
Id.
71

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2009).
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governmental entities.”72 So it is at least facially plausible that a Supreme Court
opinion stating explicitly that the Constitution is not violated by certain overt
government contacts with a represented defendant should make said contacts
“authorized by law” for purposes of applying the rule.
For example, the California no-contact provision, Rule 2-100, provides that the
rule “shall not prohibit . . . [c]ommunications otherwise authorized by law” and then
explains that the rule is binding “unless a statutory scheme or case law will override
the rule.”73 The comment gives examples of relevant statutory schemes, and then
states: “Other applicable law also includes the authority of government prosecutors
and investigators to conduct criminal investigations, as limited by the relevant
decisional law.”74
So does the “relevant decisional law” governing “the authority of government
prosecutors and investigators to conduct criminal investigations” include Sixth
Amendment cases like Montejo and Shatzer? The Ninth Circuit says no. It has
interpreted the California rule as referring only to explicit authorization for
government attorneys to contact represented defendants.
The “authorized by law” exception to Rule 2-100 requires that a statutory
scheme expressly permit contact between an attorney and a represented
party. . . . Nothing in these [statutory] provisions [cited by the
government] expressly or impliedly authorizes contact with represented
individuals beyond that permitted by case law. [Therefore], “the authority
of government prosecutors and investigators to conduct criminal
investigations” is “limited by the relevant decisional law” to contacts
conducted prior to indictment in a non-custodial setting.75
Furthermore, the commentary also states that the “authorized by law” exception
applies “when there is applicable judicial precedent that either has found the activity
permissible under this Rule or has found the Rule inapplicable. However, the Rule
imposes ethical restrictions that go beyond those imposed by constitutional
provisions.”76
A change in a constitutional rule will not necessarily translate into a change in
the ethical rule and will not serve as a defense against ethics charges. This is
because the ethical rule has a very different doctrinal basis from the constitutional
rules of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments: While those provisions give rights to
defendants, the no-contact rule gives a right to attorneys. As the Second Circuit put
it in Hamad, another no-contact case: “The sixth amendment [sic] and the
disciplinary rule serve separate, albeit congruent purposes.”77 And the Supreme
Court of Michigan explained: “The provisions of the code are not constitutional or

72

Id. cmt. 2.

73

CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2-100 discussion (1992).

74

Id.

75

United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1461 (9th Cir. 1993).

76

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 2 (2009).

77

United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1988).
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statutory rights guaranteed to individual persons. They are instead self-imposed
internal regulations prescribing the standards of conduct for members of the bar.”78
The no-contact prohibition is waivable only by the attorney, not by the client.
Accordingly, Fifth and Sixth Amendment case law addressing the validity of
defendants’ waivers of their rights is unlikely to translate into exceptions to the nocontact rule. As the Vermont Rules of Professional Conduct explain: “The fact that
a communication does not violate a state or federal constitutional right is insufficient
to establish that the communication is permissible under this rule.”79
In short, the argument for reading a Montejo/Shatzer exception into the nocontact rule’s “authorized by law” provision is untenable. Of course, some states
might decide to adopt one. But as the codes now stand, the exception is not
available. My research assistants and I surveyed the no-contact rule case law for all
fifty states in an attempt to predict whether Montejo/Shatzer contacts would be held
to be ethics violations. We found, as expected, that almost all the states have case
law stating expressly that the no-contact rule cannot be waived by the client; this
nearly-uniform interpretation rules out the possibility of a Montejo/Shatzer exception
under existing law, because Montejo and Shatzer are waiver cases. There is not a
shred of authority in any state supporting the proposition that a client waiver can
render over uncounseled contact “authorized by law.”80
C. Undercover Investigations
The only other context in which constitutional criminal procedure case law has
been imported into the no-contact rule is undercover investigations. In that context,
courts were faced with the Massiah rule, which holds that pre-attachment, deliberate
elicitation by undercover agents of incriminating statements from represented
defendants is permissible under the Sixth Amendment.81 Despite the fact that
constitutionally permitted contacts are not necessarily also ethically permitted,
however, courts have uniformly interpreted the no-contact rule to track the
constitutional rule established by Massiah,82 so that any undercover contact
constitutionally permitted by Massiah is also ethically permissible.

78

State v. Green, 274 N.W.2d 448, 454 (Mich. 1979).

79

VT. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 5 (2009).

80

See, e.g., United States v. Talao, 222 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Lopez, 4
F.3d at 1462 (holding that a criminal defendant did not have a right not to be contacted and
consequently could not waive application of section 2-100).
81

Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964).

82

See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 595 F.3d 498, 516 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that preindictment use of undercovers to elicit incriminating statements is permissible under
applicable state ethics rules); United States v. Powe, 9 F.3d 68, 69 (9th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731, 740 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346,
1366 (D.C. Cir. 1986); United States v. Dobbs, 711 F.2d 84, 86 (8th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Weiss, 599 F.2d 730, 740 (5th Cir. 1979); cf. United States v. Heinz, 983 F.2d 609, 613 (5th
Cir. 1993) (holding the same as a general matter, but egregious prosecutorial misconduct can
be a violation); United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 840 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v.
Fitterer, 710 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941, 956
(D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Marcus, 849 F. Supp. 417, 422 (D. Md. 1994).
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Indeed, in the Hammad decision from the Second Circuit, which is one of the
few instances in which a federal court has found a no-contact violation, the court
took care to emphasize that the prosecutor’s conduct—creating a “sham” grand jury
subpoena to trick the target—went beyond the mine-run of undercover
investigations.83 In most cases, the court stated, “the use of informants by
government prosecutors in a pre-indictment, non-custodial situation, absent the type
of misconduct that occurred in this case, will generally fall within the ‘authorized by
law’ exception.”84
Significantly, the Ninth Circuit has held that the no-contact rule does not apply at
all prior to attachment, explaining that “[t]he prosecutor’s ethical duty to refrain
from contacting represented defendants entifies upon indictment for the same
reasons that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches.”85 Thus, prosecutors
may authorize undercover contacts with represented defendants up until the initiation
of formal adversarial proceedings, when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
attaches. It is irrelevant that the defendant has a lawyer, has been charged by
complaint, and knows an indictment is coming.
One might well ask why the ethical obligation should entify only upon
indictment—after all, many pre-indictment suspects know that they are under
investigation—some defendants may know that an indictment is forthcoming; others
know that they are targets and retain counsel precisely to help them avoid
indictment.86 This is standard operating procedure in white-collar cases, where an
indictment can functionally be a “death sentence.”87 It is also standard operating
procedure in districts with “fast-track” programs, which offer substantial discounts
for pre-indictment pleas. And it is of necessity standard operating procedure in
every federal case in which the defendant is arrested on a complaint, because the
rules of criminal procedure provide for appointment of counsel at the initial
appearance.88 Thus, there is in most federal criminal cases a window of two weeks
83

Hammad, 858 F.2d at 840.

84

Id. The only other circuit court decision I am aware of in which the court upheld a
finding of an ethical violation also concerned unusual conduct that converted otherwise
permissible contact into a violation. See Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455. The prosecutor in Lopez had
sought and obtained a court order to communicate with a represented defendant, who had
contacted the prosecutor because he did not trust his attorney. Id. at 1457. The district court
found, however, that the prosecutor had misled the magistrate judge who issued the order, and
the Ninth Circuit accepted that finding, holding that “judicial approval cannot absolve the
government from responsibility for wrongful acts when the government has misled the court
in obtaining its sanction.” Id. at 1461.
85

Lopez, 4 F.3d at 1460.

86

This is, after all, the primary function of expensive white-collar defense lawyers.

87

Particularly, this is the case if the defendant is a corporation. See, e.g., Christopher
Wray & Robert Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World: The Thomson
Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1097 (2006) (“Because indictment
often amounts to a virtual death sentence for business entities, a corporate prosecution
provides the government an ‘opportunity for deterrence on a massive scale.’” (quoting
Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of Dep’t Components
and
United
States
Attorneys
(Jan.
20,
2003),
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm)).
88

FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a).
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or more in which the defendant is represented but the Sixth Amendment has not
attached. Does Lopez allow for prosecutors to contact defendants in that period
without the presence or consent of counsel? It appears to.89
Of course, prosecutors never have. I prosecuted hundreds of reactive cases and
never would have dreamed of directly contacting a pre-attachment defendant who
had been appointed counsel. Aside from internal department regulations, there was a
constitutional reason: Jackson. Before Montejo, neither police nor prosecutors
would have contemplated making direct contact with a represented defendant even in
a pre-indictment in a fast-track case because it was barred by Jackson.90 But now
that the constitutional bar imposed by Jackson has been wiped away, is there any
ethical bar, in states where the ethical obligation doesn’t entify until indictment?
The answer, I think, is likely no.
The courts holding that pre-indictment, undercover contacts are permissible
justified their holdings with reference to the purposes of the ethics rules and the
balancing of social harms and benefits of criminal investigation. For example, in
United States v. Balter,91 the Third Circuit held that a federal prosecutor did not
violate New Jersey’s no-contact rule92 when he used a confidential informant to
contact a represented person in the course of a pre-indictment investigation. The
court held both that “the rule d[oes] not apply to a criminal suspect prior to the
commencement of adversarial proceedings against the suspect,” and also that even if
it did apply, “pre-indictment investigation by prosecutors is precisely the type of
contact exempted from the Rule as ‘authorized by law.’”93 The court explained its
holding on policy grounds. “Prohibiting prosecutors from investigating an
unindicted suspect who has retained counsel would serve only to insulate certain
classes of suspects from ordinary pre-indictment investigation. Furthermore, such a
rule would significantly hamper legitimate law enforcement operations by making it
very difficult to investigate certain individuals.”94
The Third Circuit recently reiterated its Balter holdings in United States v.
Brown. “The question before us then is whether AUSA Daniel was ‘authorized by
law’ to use a confidential informant to communicate with a represented suspect in
the course of a pre-indictment investigation.”95 The court held that the “wellestablished investigative technique” employed by the prosecutor—sending an
undercover informant to contact the defendant with instructions on what to say—was
within the “authorized by law exception” and thus did not violate the rule.96 This
89

It bears emphasis that the contact in Lopez was direct, not undercover. Lopez, 4 F.3d at

1457.
90

See supra text accompanying note 18.

91

United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 436 (3d Cir. 1996).

92

The rule was identical to ABA Model Rule 4.2: “In representing a client, a lawyer shall
not communicate about the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless authorized by law to do so.” Balter, 91
F.3d at 435 (quoting N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2004)).
93

Balter, 91 F.3d at 436.

94

Id.

95

United States v. Brown, 595 F.3d 498, 515 (3d Cir. 2010).

96

Id. at 516.
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was so, the court held, even though the Pennsylvania no-contact rule applies before
adversarial proceedings have begun, because such contacts are within the
“authorized by law” exception, even if other kinds of pre-indictment contact might
violate the rule. “[W]e do not believe the McDade Amendment prohibits federal
prosecutors in Pennsylvania from using a well-established investigatory technique
simply because the Pennsylvania courts have not considered whether such conduct is
permissible.”97
Is it perhaps significant, then, that the targets of pre-indictment undercover
investigations are virtually never in custody?98 One rationale for the exception is
that undercover investigation is simply so vital to law-enforcement that absent
explicit legislative action courts should not assume it to be barred.99 Indeed, most
states’ ethics commentary follows the ABA Model Rules and specifically identifies
“pre-indictment, non-custodial” contacts as among those authorized. If the contact is
pre-indictment and non-custodial, should it matter whether it’s undercover or overt?
Some courts have held that so long as the contact is pre-attachment, it is per se
permissible whether overt or covert. As one district court commented in approving
overt contact under the rule:
Although these cases usually involve undercover contacts, most of the
decisions approve pre-indictment contacts in categorical terms. Research
shows that no court has ever suppressed evidence in a criminal case
because a prosecutor violated Rule 4.2 in the course of an investigation
before the grand jury indicted the defendant.100
Although the contacted defendant in Binder was not in custody, such dicta
(“most of the decisions approve pre-indictment contacts in categorical terms”)101 at
least allows for a plausible argument that any pre-attachment contact is permissible.
As to post-attachment contact, it is highly unlikely that any court would allow it
under the ethics rules, because the “authorized by law” exception for undercover
contacts has never been applied post-attachment. Let us now turn, then, to the four
scenarios described at the outset to see whether meaningful guidance for law
enforcement and defendants can be gleaned from the new holdings.

97

Id.

98

See, e.g., United States v. Dobbs, 711 F.2d 84 (8th Cir. 1983) (no ethical violation
because subject not in custody).
99
The same reasoning explains why the ethical rule, 8.4 in the ABA Model Rules,
forbidding lawyers from engaging in “dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation,” has
never been held applicable to undercover work in criminal cases. Every court to consider the
matter has simply stated that there is a law-enforcement exception that applies to prosecutors.
As one recent commentator points out, a general public-policy rationale would also seem to
support exceptions for some private attorneys too, such as for civil rights investigations. See
Barry Temkin, Deception in Undercover Investigations: Conduct-Based vs. Status-Based
Ethical Analysis, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 123 (2008).
100

United States v. Binder, 167 F. Supp. 2d 862, 866 (E.D.N.C. 2001).

101

Id.
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IV. FOUR SCENARIOS: MONTEJO AND SHATZER, PRE- AND POST-ATTACHMENT
A. Pre-Attachment Montejo Contacts
1. Police
May police initiate contact, pre-attachment, with a represented defendant who
has been appointed counsel but has not yet invoked in a Miranda setting? Yes.
Jackson’s prophylactic rule barred police-initiated questioning after the appointment
of counsel and held any waivers thus obtained invalid as a matter of law. Jackson is
now overruled, and the new rule is clear: Until a defendant invokes his Miranda
rights during an attempted custodial interrogation, the police may initiate contact
and seek a waiver.102
2. Prosecutor
In any state with case law holding that the ethical obligation “entifies” upon
attachment of the Sixth Amendment, there is no ethical bar to the prosecutor
participating. In such a state, the prosecutor is in the same position as the police:
The only reason not to make such contacts was Jackson, and Jackson is overruled.
Thus, for prosecutors in such jurisdictions—for example, in California—the same
rule applies: Until a defendant invokes his Miranda rights during an attempted
custodial interrogation, the prosecutor may initiate contact and seek a waiver, as
well as direct the police to do so.103
Of course, the situation is different in states, such as Pennsylvania and
Minnesota, where the no-contact rule has been interpreted to apply to pre-attachment
contact. But even in such states, prosecutors may have a colorable argument for
permissibility, depending on the specific test the courts use to evaluate alleged
violations. Conduct may be covered by, but permissible under, the rule. In
Minnesota, for instance, the rule is applied on a case-by-case basis to pre-attachment
as well as post-attachment contact. The test, in either scenario, is whether the
prosecutor has gone beyond “appropriate and commonly accepted investigatory
activity of police.”104
Adverse counsel’s contacts with an attorney’s client can be disruptive and
deleterious to the attorney’s relationship with a client irrespective of
whether the client has been charged with a crime, and the need for an
attorney’s counsel in an adverse interview is certainly no less before the
client is charged than after. We hold that the appropriate analysis is to
look at alleged violations on a case-by-case basis, examining the totality
of the circumstances of the contact to determine if it went beyond
appropriate and commonly accepted investigatory activity of police to
implicate issues relating to the fair administration of justice on the part of
the prosecuting attorney.105
102

Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2091.

103

Id.

104

Miller, 600 N.W.2d at 467.

105

Id.
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This test may make the ethics rule dependent on the constitutional rule to some
extent, because the constitutional rule will, over time, set the boundaries of
“appropriate and commonly accepted investigatory activity.” Now that Montejo and
Shatzer are the law, police contact with represented defendants in those scenarios
could (and, one assumes, will) become “commonly accepted investigatory activity of
police.” The only reason police didn’t do post-appointment interviews with willing
defendants without their counsel present was Jackson. There is now, as the Supreme
Court itself said expressly, no reason not to do it.106 Of course, some agencies,
notably the federal DOJ, prohibit such contacts in their own internal rules, but one
imagines not every police department will follow suit. Thus, if the Minnesota nocontact rule derives its scope from what police may legitimately do, and what they
habitually do, there may be an argument before too long that Montejo and Shatzer
have turned Miller on its head.
To be sure, though, there is surely some distance between police conduct that is
not unconstitutional, and police conduct that is “appropriate and commonly
accepted.”107 And in jurisdictions without a clear holding, the custodial nature of the
contact might tip the balance in a functional inquiry into whether a Montejo
interview is “deleterious to the attorney’s relationship” with the client.108 I would
think the Miller rationale would favor finding a violation: Certainly if Montejo’s
lawyer had been present, he would have advised Montejo not to make the
incriminating statements that ultimately were used at his trial.
This is exactly what happened in United States v. Ward.109 The prosecutor,
without defense counsel present, visited the suspect, who had not been indicted but
knew he was a target and had retained defense counsel.110 The prosecutor told the
suspect that the government’s case was strong, an indictment was coming, and
suggested that the suspect should think about cooperating.111 Defense counsel
moved for suppression based on the allegedly improper contact. The government
argued in district court that this contact was not improper because the no-contact rule
did not apply pre-indictment.112 The court acknowledged the “impressive number of
106

Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2086-87.
No reason exists to assume that a defendant like Montejo, who has done
nothing at all to express his intentions with respect to his Sixth
Amendment rights, would not be perfectly amenable to speaking with the
police without having counsel present. And no reason exists to prohibit
the police from inquiring.

Id. (emphasis in original).
107

One thinks, for example, of Lago Vista police officer Bart Turek, whose arrest of Gail
Atwater for not wearing her seatbelt did not violate Atwater’s Fourth Amendment rights, but
did cost Turek his job and a Supreme Court tongue-lashing. See Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532
U.S. 318 (2001).
108

See, e.g., United States v. Durham, 475 F.2d 208, 210-11 (7th Cir. 1973) (preindictment custodial interview “raised questions” under no-contact rule).
109

United States v. Ward, 895 F. Supp. 1000 (N.D. Ill. 1995).

110

Id. at 1003.

111

Id.

112

Id. at 1004.
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opinions persuasively reasoning that [the no-contact rule] does not and should not
apply to pre-indictment, non-custodial contacts.”113
The court, however, did not endorse the government’s interpretation of the
ethical rule. Instead, it denied the defendant’s suppression motion because
suppression would not be a proper remedy for an ethical violation in any event.114
Thus it did not decide the ethical issue. The court made it plain, however, that if it
had been forced to decide the ethics issue, it would have found a violation:
Given that the stated purpose of the meeting was to confront Ward with
the allegedly overwhelming nature of the evidence against him and to
discuss his cooperation options, the danger for Ward of uncounseled
communication with the Government is readily apparent. Couple this
danger with the power of the prosecutor to control the timing of the
indictment and the triggering of constitutional protections which would
prohibit such contact and the potential for prejudice and abuse of power
increases. In contrast to the covert use of informants, the Court finds the
balance of competing interests weighs in favor of prohibiting overt
contacts with represented parties for the purposes of discussing
cooperation with the Government.115
What the court describes is, of course, every Montejo contact—with the added factor
that the Montejo defendant, unlike Ward, will be in custody. Without some very
clear black-letter protection, it would be a reckless prosecutor who signed off on one
of these interviews. My advice to prosecuting authorities around the country: Don’t
do these interviews, and don’t use them, until your legislature or courts give you
very clear authority.
B. Post-Attachment Montejo Contacts
1. Police
As to the police, the same rule applies to post-attachment Montejo contacts as to
pre-attachment contacts: Until a defendant invokes his Miranda rights during an
attempted custodial interrogation, the police may initiate contact and seek a waiver.
It is irrelevant whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has attached, because,
per Montejo, the right can be waived; and it is irrelevant whether counsel is present,
because, per Montejo, counsel’s presence is not necessary for a valid waiver. Thus
the same rule applies: Until a defendant invokes his Miranda rights during an
attempted custodial interrogation, the police may initiate contact and seek a
waiver.116
2. Prosecutors
The no-contact rule is always applicable post-attachment, and prosecutors cannot
make contact with a represented defendant except as “authorized by law.” And it is
doubtful, as explained above, that a court would treat Montejo as creating a new
113

Id. at 1008.

114

Id. at 1007.

115

Id. at 1006.

116

Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2091.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2010

19

766

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:747

“authorized by law” exception for three reasons: First, Montejo is a Sixth
Amendment case, and the no-contact rule does not necessarily follow the Sixth
Amendment; second, the Montejo Court itself assumes that Montejo contacts would
be unethical for prosecutors; and third, Montejo is a waiver case, and the no-contact
prohibition is not waiveable by clients.
C. Pre-Attachment Shatzer Contacts
The paradigmatic pre-attachment Shatzer contact will occur in the following
way: Assume a federal court proceeding, where the Sixth Amendment doesn’t attach
until indictment. DEA agents arrest a suspect for drug trafficking. The government
files a complaint charging, say, 21 U.S.C. § 841. The suspect invokes his right to
counsel; the interview is terminated per Edwards; the suspect appears in court and is
appointed counsel; bail is set, and the suspect makes bail and is released. Appointed
defense counsel calls the prosecutor and they talk about possible terms of a plea
agreement. The prosecutor tells defense counsel that he can offer very good terms if
the suspect will disclose his supplier. Defense counsel consults with her client and
tells the prosecutor that he’s not going to snitch.
Now, two weeks later, the suspect has not yet been indicted on the federal
charges (the government has thirty days to do so). He has gone back to work, but
unluckily sells drugs to a local police officer working undercover. He is arrested.
The local police run his sheet, see the pending federal charges, and call the DEA
agents. The agents arrive at the local jail, approach the suspect, re-Mirandize him,
and ask him if he would like to change his mind and cooperate. After all, they
remind him, federal cooperation can make the state beef disappear too.117 This time,
he says yes, and agrees to flip and incriminate his connections. No one ever calls his
lawyer.
1. Police
As before, the question is a straightforward one for the police or agents: Yes,
they may do this.118
2. Prosecutors
For the prosecutor, it’s a closer call. To be sure, this is a pre-indictment scenario,
and in states such as California, the prosecutor may successfully rely on case law
such as Lopez to assert the absolute inapplicability of Rule 4.2 prior to attachment.
However, I would be cautious in any state where the case law even arguably left
room for pre-attachment applicability. If a state applied a functional test such as
whether the contact undermined the purposes of the attorney-client relationship, I
think a court could well see this as a violation. After all, the client indisputably has
an attorney on the matter, despite the legal fiction that there is no “matter” preindictment: Here, the court has appointed the attorney to represent the defendant on
the federal charge, and the attorney has already begun negotiations with the
prosecutor on that charge. And the defendant has already told the police, in the first
interview, that he wants his attorney to serve as a buffer. To be sure, after Shatzer,
he can constitutionally change his mind, but that’s not the ethical question in a state
117

As a matter of comity, self-interest, and overwork, state prosecutors are almost always
willing to hand a case over to the feds.
118

See supra Part IV.A.1.
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like Minnesota. The question, rather, is whether the contact served to undermine the
attorney-client relationship on the federal charge. And given that, by definition, a
Shatzer scenario involves a relationship that is at least two weeks old, and has
already been sought out and relied on by the defendant, it would seem that Shatzer
contacts would be more readily seen as violating the rule than Montejo contacts on
such a test.
D. Post-Attachment Shatzer Contacts
1. Police
For the police, as with Montejo contacts, attachment is irrelevant. The rule is the
same: Give a guy two weeks of freedom, and you can re-initiate custodial
interrogation in the attempt to get a waiver. Obviously, a cycle of biweekly pretext
arrests followed by a custodial re-initiation might lead to an inference of badgering
in violation of Edwards119—but short of badgering, the contact is constitutional, and
if you do get lucky and get your waiver, it will stand.
2. Prosecutors
I cannot see any possibility of post-attachment Shatzer contacts being permitted
under the ethics rules, for all the reasons given thus far. Thus, as noted below, this is
an area in which difficult cases are likely to arise. I think it not unlikely that a
defendant, out on bail post-indictment, with a lengthy pre-trial period, might be
arrested (in good faith, presumably by another agency on other grounds) and the
agents handling the first case might learn of the arrest and decide to re-approach. As
discussed below, I see no possibility of permissible prosecutorial involvement and a
real danger of imputed involvement through ratification if the prosecutor uses a
statement obtained in this way.
E. Discussion
Both the time of attachment, and the relevance of attachment for the no-contact
rule, vary from state to state. In some jurisdictions, for example California and New
Jersey, the no-contact rule only binds prosecutors once formal adversarial
proceedings have begun and the Sixth Amendment has attached.120 In others, for
example Pennsylvania and Minnesota, the rule applies before attachment as well.
Thus, while Montejo itself involved post-attachment contact,121 in other
jurisdictions (notably the federal system), the same facts would not give rise to
attachment. And the rule itself may or may not track attachment in any event. For
example, in New Jersey, prosecutors would not be barred from making postappointment, pre-indictment contact with a defendant, while across the river in
Pennsylvania, they would.
119

Both Montejo and Shatzer emphasize the Edwards anti-badgering rule.
Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1220.

See, e.g.,

120

See, e.g., New Jersey v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp., 589 A.2d 180, 183 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1991).
121
State v. Montejo, 974 So. 2d 1238, 1260 (La. 2008) (“In this case, defendant’s right to
counsel attached at the 72-hour hearing held on the morning of September 10, 2002, at which
time indigent defense counsel was appointed to represent him.”), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 2079.
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There is no question, however, that the constitutionality of Montejo contacts
extends past attachment. The Montejo Court explicitly decided the case as a postattachment scenario:
It is worth emphasizing first what is not in dispute or at stake here. Under
our precedents, once the adversary judicial process has been initiated, the
Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to have counsel
present at all “critical” stages of the criminal proceedings. Interrogation
by the State is such a stage.
....
In practice, Montejo’s rule would prevent police-initiated
interrogation entirely once the Sixth Amendment right attaches . . . . That
would have constituted a “shockingly dramatic restructuring of the
balance this Court has traditionally struck between the rights of the
defendant and those of the larger society.”122
It is important to note, however, that while in many states a similar attachment
rule (viz.: attachment at early stages of proceedings, such as initial appearance or
complaint) applies, in the federal system it emphatically does not. Sixth Amendment
attachment in federal criminal prosecutions comes only at indictment or waiver
thereof. So every federal defendant arrested on a complaint (which is, in some
districts, for example the southwest border, virtually every defendant) and appointed
counsel at his initial appearance has a two-week or so window during which he is
represented, but he does not yet have Sixth Amendment rights. In California, the
prosecutor’s no-contact obligation has not yet “entified” during that period. And this
window would cover every Montejo situation—viz.: where the defendant waived
Miranda and made an initial statement, and then the detectives want to follow up
again after the initial appearance.
The window could also stretch to some Shatzer scenarios, because the maximum
period between arrest and indictment is thirty days,123 and can be extended further in
certain circumstances.124 Thus, where the defendant is arrested on a complaint,
invokes, is appointed counsel, then makes bail and is released from custody, I think
the answer has to be the same once two weeks have passed, because a Shatzer
defendant with two weeks of freedom is a Montejo defendant.
The hard issues will arise upon indictment, when the Sixth Amendment attaches
and the prosecutor’s ethical obligation entifies. The ABA model rule explicitly
limits the scope of the “authorized by law” exception to pre-attachment contacts.125
Montejo and Shatzer now allow for post-attachment contact in particular
circumstances. Of course, a legislature or bar committee could revise the rule or
commentary to include a Montejo/Shatzer post-attachment exception. But until that
happens, prosecutors should be cautious, because the argument that the exception
122

Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2085, 2087 (citations omitted).

123

18 U.S.C. § 3161(b).

124

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (setting out conditions for the exclusion of time).

125

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 5 (“Communications authorized by law
may also include investigative activities of lawyers representing governmental entities,
directly or through investigative agents, prior to the commencement of criminal or civil
enforcement proceedings.”).
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naturally arises from the cases is quite weak. I think that post-attachment, the limits
of action for police now diverge from those of prosecutors. I further believe that
every prosecutor’s office in the country will come to the same conclusion, and so we
will have to deal with this divergence unless and until it is addressed legislatively.
V. DIVERGING INCENTIVES AND THE POLICE-PROSECUTOR RELATIONSHIP
I doubt that any such expansion of the exception for post-attachment contacts is
likely to be forthcoming, whether from the legislature or the courts. Legislatures are
slow to act and are historically protective of attorneys’ privileges and prerogatives.126
Direct contact with a represented, opposing party, authorized by a government
lawyer, after initiation of adversarial proceedings is too much for courts and bar
committees to force into the “authorized by law” exception. We may well get
decisions saying flatly: Post-attachment Montejo/Shatzer contacts are unethical.
And of course, until the courts say something, there’s the uncomfortable legal terrain
of uncertainty, which prosecutors across the country are now trying to navigate.
The problem, however, is that from the moment these cases were decided there
ceased to be, as the Montejo Court emphatically told us, any reason at all for the
police themselves not to make these contacts. The Court dismissed any suggestion
that the ethical rules governing prosecutors should have any relevance to its decision
at all.
Thus these cases force on us the immediate and vexing problem of the policeprosecutor relationship. As a legal matter, to what extent is the prosecutor ethically
responsible for the conduct of law-enforcement officers and agents? And as
practical matter, to what extent can the prosecutor in fact control the conduct of lawenforcement officers and agents? The prosecutor must supervise investigations, but
is not in a direct chain of command with the enforcement agencies.127 This is true at
the state and federal levels and makes all the more frustrating the Supreme Court’s
unwillingness in Montejo and Shatzer to engage with the practical realities of
criminal investigation. I will argue that the practical realities of criminal
investigation require—as a policy matter if not as a constitutional matter—that the
ethical rules on contact with defendants be the same for police and agents as for
prosecutors. We could bring the prosecutors’ standard “down” or the cops’ standard
“up,” but we have to do one or the other.
Several broad features of the police-prosecutor relationship bear emphasis in this
context. First, prosecutors are charged with supervising criminal investigations and
126

This makes sense since legislatures are largely made up of lawyers, and generally favor
rules protective of the profession, as Charles Black has famously argued in the context of
evidentiary privileges. See Charles Black, The Marital and Physician Privileges–A Reprint of
a Letter to a Congressman, 1975 DUKE L.J. 45, 50 (1975).
[A]s a lawyer, I own I find it embarrassing that a group of lawyers, having so
summarily dealt with the privacies of marriage and medicine, proceed, without any
satisfactory explanation of the vast difference, to shield our own profession so amply.
I wonder what kind of Rules we would have gotten if the doctors had drawn them.
Id. at 50. It’s important to note that while legislatures are traditionally no friend of criminal
defendants, this no-contact rule is about the lawyers, not the perps. Id. at 50.
127

See Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 749, 755-56 (2003).
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are held accountable for the conduct of police and agents working their cases.
Second, the police and agents working a case are not under the direct control of the
assigned prosecutor, and the agencies themselves are not, with very few exceptions,
under the direct supervision of the prosecuting office. Third, prosecutors, as
attorneys, have independent cultural ties and professional obligations that may not
always align with those of police and agents.
A. Agency Priorities
Prosecutors supervise criminal investigations. They do not simply take cases in,
fully made out and wrapped up in a red ribbon. As a matter of policy and of
practice, prosecutors are involved in both proactive (pre-arrest) and reactive (postarrest) investigations from the earliest stage possible. Indeed, prosecutorial
involvement in police investigations is a key component in the modern
professionalization of law enforcement and the great reductions in police corruption
and brutality. And courts hold prosecutors responsible for law-enforcement conduct
in myriad ways.
Furthermore, prosecutors do not directly control enforcement resources. There
are overlapping chains of authority. This is not like civil litigation, where the
investigators are direct employees of the lawyers. In the federal system, for
example, investigating agents work for a number of different agencies, some of
which are under the umbrella of DOJ, and some of which are not. And even
agencies that are within DOJ, notably the FBI, are notoriously independent. In state
systems, likewise, police departments do not answer directly to district attorneys’
offices.
Further complicating matters, some agencies, again paradigmatically the FBI,
have multiple priorities, some of which diverge from the prosecutor’s goal of
charging and convicting perpetrators of crime. The FBI has security and
intelligence-gathering missions as well, which have repeatedly led to practices—
warrantless wiretapping, black bag searches, facilitation of and participation in
organized crime, long-term cultivation of criminals as informants—inimical to the
development of admissible evidence.128 This institutional duality has only been
magnified in the post-9/11 era, as the Bureau has shifted large numbers of agencies
to counterterrorism work where intelligence, rather than convictions, is the primary
goal.
A similar duality is present in many local police departments, which may
measure public-safety success in terms of, for example, the number of guns or
amount of drugs seized, rather than in convictions. If the goal is to seize guns rather
128

This duality has been present since the creation of the FBI, and has manifested itself in
the Bureau’s approach to organized crime, civil rights, and communism. See generally, e.g.,
RHODRI JEFFRYS-JONES, THE FBI: A HISTORY (2007). Intelligence-gathering and prosecution
of crimes are notoriously incompatible bedfellows. Most recently, and strikingly, after 9/11
the Bureau explicitly announced its focus on intelligence and security rather than prosecution.
See, e.g., Tom Lininger, Sects, Lies, and Videotape: The Surveillance and Infiltration of
Religious Groups, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1201 (2004) (“Attorney General John D. Ashcroft and
F.B.I. Director Robert S. Mueller III have repeatedly said that they view preventing another
terror attack as their main priority, rather than securing criminal convictions.”); Robert S.
Mueller, III, Director, FBI, Speech at Stanford Law School (Oct. 18, 2002) (announcing that
“in the wake of September 11, our first and abiding priority, plain and simple, is
counterterrorism”).
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than to prosecute illegal possessors, the incentives with regard to stop-and-frisk
policies will obviously be different. A constitutionally over-broad stop-and-frisk
policy will seize a lot of guns; many of those stopped will, however, have
meritorious suppression claims, so the charges will go nowhere. But return of
contraband is not a remedy, so the gun is off the streets. The most dramatic example
of this calibration of incentives was the NYPD’s Street Crimes Unit in the Guiliani
Administration.129
B. Training, Supervision, and Direction
If Montejo/Shatzer contacts are held to violate the no-contact rules, then clearly a
prosecutor could not, in a particular case, direct an agent to engage in such contacts.
But the situation is more complicated, because the prosecutor’s professional
relationship with law enforcement agents is not one of boss and employee.
Consider the central, and vital, prosecutorial function of advising agents on the
legal limits of investigatory tactics.
Training law-enforcement officers on
constitutional developments is a key prosecutorial function; so is answering legal
questions posed by law enforcement. Sooner or later, one way or another, word will
filter down through the ranks that the Supreme Court has cleared the way for
renewed contact in these two situations. If leading a training on new Miranda
developments, or if asked by an agent what the cases held, a prosecutor could, no
doubt, ethically explain the rules announced by the cases. The governing regulation
for federal attorneys distinguishes prosecutorial training and advice-giving from
supervision and direction.130 But where, in the context of working a case together, is
the line between explaining the rule announced by the cases (okay), and suggesting,
advising, authorizing, or ratifying the contact (not okay)?
Here’s an example: The (pre-Montejo) FBI Legal Handbook for Special Agents
includes131 the following directive:
129
See, e.g., David Kocienewski, Success of Elite Police Unit Exacts a Toll on the Streets,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1999, at A1.

Some street crimes officers also said they felt pressured by the department’s emphasis
on crime statistics, and that they are forced to adhere to an unwritten quota system that
demands that each officer seize at least one gun a month. “There are guys who are
willing to toss anyone who’s walking with his hands in his pockets,” said an officer,
who spoke on the condition of anonymity. “We frisk 20, maybe 30 people a day. Are
they all by the book? Of course not; it’s safer and easier to just toss people. And if
it’s the 25th of the month and you haven’t got your gun yet? Things can get a little
desperate.”
Id.
130

28 C.F.R. § 77.4(f) (2010).

Investigative Agents. A Department attorney shall not direct an investigative agent
acting under the attorney’s supervision to engage in conduct under circumstances that
would violate the attorney’s obligations under section 530B. A Department attorney
who in good faith provides legal advice or guidance upon request to an investigative
agent should not be deemed to violate these rules.
Id.
131

Or, at least, the version on the Bureau’s public FOIA page does. Whether it has been
revised in response to Montejo, I don’t know.
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If an accused, during the course of an initial appearance or other court
proceeding, requests to be represented by legal counsel or accepts the
court appointment of counsel, no interview of the accused may take place
concerning the charge for which the accused has appeared in court unless
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

the accused’s counsel is present; or
the accused initiates the contact . . . or
contact is necessary to acquire information critical to life . . . or
the contact has been approved by the United State’s Attorney’s
office.132

It would appear that the Handbook was written to comply with the prevailing
constitutional rules, because it directly tracks the pre-Montejo law. Now, however,
after Montejo, the manual is more restrictive than the prevailing constitutional rule.
Subsection (d) makes clear that consultation with the AUSA is expected in
ambiguous circumstances.
So what happens when an FBI agent comes to an AUSA and says, “Hey, look,
the Manual says no contact after counsel’s been appointed, but I heard about this
new case, and I went to my SAC, and he said go ask the AUSA”? That is exactly
what one would expect, and hope for, in a professional law enforcement agency. So
you’re the AUSA: What do you say? Assume the no-contact rule applies: Either
you’re post-attachment or you’re in a state where the rule applies pre-attachment.
Do you say, “Well, yes, you are constitutionally permitted to do it, and I am
permitted to tell you that you are constitutionally permitted to do it, but I am not
ethically permitted to direct you to do it”? (And of course you both know that it
could help your case.)
The agent leaves your office and does the interview. He gets a good waiver and
then a solid, incriminating statement from the defendant. You call defense counsel:
“Let’s talk about your plea; your guy just confessed.” Defense counsel finds out
what happened, starts yelling, then files an ethics complaint against you. Are you in
trouble or not?
Or take a typical state case, where the police are working largely independently.
A detective goes out and does the interview without asking the prosecutor first and
then brings the statement to the prosecutor for use at trial. Ex hypothesi, the
detective was not directed by the prosecutor to do the interview. Nor are all the
detective’s actions imputed to the prosecutor as a matter of law, because the
detective is not the prosecutor’s employee and works for a separate agency with an
independent interest in interviewing the suspect. As explained above, in the normal
investigatory hierarchy, the prosecutor lacks the power to expressly forbid the
contact. Nor is it likely that the prosecutor would be able to preemptively urge the
police not to do the interview, because law enforcement officers or agents are
virtually always working a case before a prosecutor is assigned to it. Given the
legality of the contact, and the possibility of other agency priorities (for example,
132

FBI LEGAL HANDBOOK FOR SPECIAL AGENTS, 7-4.1(7), available at http://www.fbi.gov
(search “Legal Handbook for Special Agents” in the search bar; click on the first link; click on
hyperlink that reads “Legal Handbook for Special Agents (Released 2003)”). Exceptions (b)
and (c) are the standard Edwards and Quarles exceptions. Exception (d) is a trickier case; the
handbook says it concerns “extenuating circumstances such as defense counsel’s involvement
in the criminal offense or other serious conflicts of interest.” Id.
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intelligence gathering or seizure of weapons), it’s likely that agents may have
reasons for wanting to engage in these contacts even if told by the prosecutor to lay
off.
The question is whether in any of these situations—where the prosecutor gives
accurate legal advice knowing that the agent will follow it, but does not direct the
agent to do so; where the prosecutor gives no advance direction but then later uses
the evidence; or where the prosecutor issues a no-contact order that the agents
disregard, and then uses the fruits of their contact—the prosecutor has violated his
ethical duty and is subject to sanction. There would obviously be no constitutional
barrier to the introduction of the evidence; the only question would be whether the
prosecutor would risk bar discipline.133
It is at least arguable that trial use could constitute ratification.134 Prosecutors
have been held to have ratified police conduct by exploiting it after the fact.135 And
certainly as an institutional matter, one could argue that the regular use by
prosecutors of constitutionally obtained evidence that they could not ethically
participate in gathering would seem to be a de facto ratification of the police practice
of gathering the evidence. If we were dealing with corporate responsibility for
employee actions, liability would be fairly clear.136
But we’re not. And that fact makes this a more difficult problem than the usual
“see no evil” dilemma in criminal investigation, which arises when a prosecutor
doesn’t ask questions about agents’ methods, and thus gets a reputation as a go-to
guy for agents inclined to use unsavory or illegal tactics. It is more difficult because,
first, in this case, the “evil” is not actually evil—the cop who does a Montejo/Shatzer
interview and gets a statement has done nothing wrong—and second, the ethical
analysis on imputed responsibility is much less clear for criminal investigation than
133
Every court that has considered this issue has said suppression wouldn’t be an
appropriate remedy even if the conduct was unethical. See, e.g., Hammad, 858 F.2d at 840;
Lopez, 4 F.3d at 1464.
134

This is arguable, but by no means certain. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396, n.55 (1995) (stating that the use of evidence is not
ratification if the attorney was not involved in improper acquisition).
135

See, e.g., Miller, 600 N.W.2d at 458 (holding that prosecutor ratified police officer’s
action in interviewing suspect outside the presence of counsel by failing to terminate the
interview after learning of it, and thereby violated no-contact rule).
136
See, e.g., United States v. Potter, 463 F.3d 9, 25-26 (1st Cir. 2006) (stating a corporation
cannot “avoid liability by adopting abstract rules” that forbid its agents from engaging in
illegal acts, because “[e]ven a specific directive to an agent or employee or honest efforts to
police such rules do not automatically free the company for the wrongful acts of agents”);
United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir. 1983) (“[A] corporation may
be held criminally responsible for antitrust violations committed by its employees if they were
acting within the scope of their authority, or apparent authority, and for the benefit of the
corporation, even if . . . such acts were against corporate policy or express instructions.”);
United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[A] corporation may be liable for
acts of its employees done contrary to express instructions and policies, but . . . the existence
of such instructions and policies may be considered in determining whether the employee in
fact acted to benefit the corporation.”); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000,
1007 (9th Cir. 1972) (noting that a corporation “could not gain exculpation by issuing general
instructions without undertaking to enforce those instructions by means commensurate with
the obvious risks”).
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for civil litigation. In sharp distinction from civil litigation, in criminal investigation
the agents don’t work for the lawyers. Dan Richman puts his finger on it: “One
often hears rookie prosecutors refer to ‘my agents.’ Most soon learn to drop the
possessive.”137
Prosecutorial insistence on agency abstention from perfectly legal,
investigatively valuable tactics is a recipe for open conflict with the agency,
concomitant lack of agency cooperation, and—worse—lack of full disclosure to the
prosecutor about agents’ investigative activities.138 Such lack of disclosure can lead
to myriad ethical and constitutional violations, which is why achieving close
prosecutorial supervision of investigations from as early on as possible is the policy
of the Justice Department. The best way to thwart this policy is to drive a wedge
between the incentives of the two institutions. Richman’s reaction to the McDade
Amendment presciently anticipates the Montejo/Shatzer problem:
[A] significant regulatory gap has now been created between prosecutors
and agents, as agents, not bound by the ethics rules, remain free to contact
represented targets overtly and covertly, so long as they do not involve
prosecutors in such endeavors. . . . To the extent one’s goal is to ensure
prosecutorial involvement in investigative decisionmaking, the McDade
Amendment and the unreflective application of ethical rules governing
investigations to prosecutors generally are thus large steps in the wrong
direction (and unlikely to prove effective in restraining investigative
contacts with represented parties).139
When Professor Richman wrote the above, Jackson was still the law, Edwards
was still unlimited temporally, and agents were thus barred from initiating custodial
contact in Montejo and Shatzer situations. Montejo and Shatzer drive the wedge
even deeper, and put the prosecutor in a very difficult ethical position. The
competent prosecutor is on notice of Supreme Court case law, and is on notice of
what the investigating agents are doing. Thus the situation will arise, for example, in
which a defendant has invoked and is out on bail, and the agents—who will
themselves almost certainly be aware of Shatzer—propose going to talk to him to
see if they can coax a waiver out of him now that he’s free. The agents tell the
prosecutor their plan. What should the prosecutor tell them? This is a real dilemma.
One horn is the ethical rule: no contact. There is no way around that one—if you’re
doing your job, the agents will ask you before they buttonhole the guy, and you’re
on the hook if you authorize or ratify: You are in charge now, and these guys are
“your” agents as far as the rule is concerned.
The other horn is that the Court has just said it is perfectly legal for the agents to
go out and make contact. There is no reason for the cops not to do it.
137

Richman, supra note 127, at 756. I should note that I was lucky enough to work in an
office that provided good training and mentoring on the subtleties of the prosecutor-agent
relationship, but I still tripped over this locution, and its analogous practical manifestations,
from time to time. One quickly learns the difference between making suggestions and giving
orders.
138
See, e.g., Lininger, supra note 128, at 1268 (considering the problem of internal agency
regulation of police conduct in light of the fact that internal regulations are unenforceable by
the courts).
139

Richman, supra note 127, at 821-22.
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Many lawyers would here interject, “So what! There’s no dilemma. You tell
them not to do it. Period.” I sympathize with the sentiment, I think, but it’s not that
simple. The prosecutor has a duty to—and surely, is ethically permitted to—
accurately explain constitutional case law to law enforcement personnel. So say
you’re doing training for investigative agents. I think you have to talk about
Montejo and Shatzer, and you have to say: “This is legal. You may approach, you
may ask for a waiver, and if you get one the evidence will come in.” You then say
(presumably): “Prosecutors are bound by rules of attorney ethics, which clearly
forbid this contact, whether in person or by proxy.” I think you have to say both, or
you are misleading the agents.
Then you finish the training session and you leave, and the agent bosses sit
around and plan strategy. They’re not dumb: They have to recognize that the
Supreme Court is inviting them to do this. So the agents come up with their own
policy: You can do this, but you can’t tell the prosecutor about it first.
Assume the agents develop this strategy. It seems to me it works once. The first
time it happens, the prosecutor bosses will have a talk with the agent bosses. And
once they do, all the prosecutors are now on notice of the agents’ strategy, and thus
extremely vulnerable to ethics charges if they exploit Montejo or Shatzer statements.
So what do you do? Do you call in your agents and have everyone sign a document
memorializing your direct order not to do Shatzer waiver requests? And suppose the
agents do it anyway, after signing? The evidence is admissible, sure, but are you
still on the hook ethically? Again, I think that gambit works only once.
Furthermore, what kind of relationship can you have with the investigating
agents if you’re giving an express instruction to refrain from an action and they’re
ignoring you? I for one would not want to be the prosecutor arguing to the ethics
board that I should not be held accountable for what my agents did, because hey,
they just ignore my instructions.140 Either the arrangement was a sham, or I am an
incompetent prosecutor and have only saved my ethics bacon by declaring my
professional ineptitude.
There is some evidence that the possibility of sanctions for prosecutors can
meaningfully constrain agent investigatory behavior. In 2000, the Oregon Supreme
Court held that the Oregon ethics rule that prohibited deception by attorneys
prohibited all lawyers—including prosecutors—from supervising undercover

140

This was the trap Tom Cruise set for Jack Nicholson in “A Few Good Men,” which I
can’t resist quoting here.
[Nicholson]: Ever put your life in another man’s hands, ask him to put his life in
yours? [Cruise]: No, sir. [Nicholson]: We follow orders, son. We follow orders or
people die. It’s that simple. Are we clear? . . . . [Cruise]: Colonel, I have just one
more question. Why, if you gave an order that Santiago wasn’t to be touched, and
your orders are always followed, then why would he be in danger, why would it be
necessary to transfer him off the base? [Nicholson]: Sometimes men take matters into
their own hands. [Cruise]: No sir. You made it clear just a moment ago that your men
never take matters into their own hands. Your men follow orders or people die. So
Santiago shouldn’t have been in any danger at all, should he have, Colonel?
[Nicholson]: You little bastard.
A
FEW
GOOD
MEN
(Columbia
Pictures
http://www.godamongdirectors.com/scripts/fewgood.shtml.
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investigations.141 The Oregon legislature subsequently revised the rule to allow for
supervision of undercover investigations, but the revision did not take effect until
2002, and in the interim undercover investigation largely stopped in the state.142
Professor Lininger argues that because prosecutors are so central to modern
criminal investigations, ethical restrictions on prosecutors’ conduct can meaningfully
control the conduct of investigating agencies:
[C]lose cooperation between prosecutors and police would persist even if
prosecutors are subject to stricter rules than police . . . [because] police
need prosecutors to unlock the door to the closet where the most valuable
investigative tools are kept: wiretaps, FISA warrants, grand jury
investigations, plea agreements offering leniency in exchange for
cooperation, etc.143
Lininger is arguing for revisions of state ethics rules to prohibit suspicionless
infiltration of religious groups, a practice that, like Montejo and Shatzer contacts, is
otherwise legal. His point is simple: If prosecutors won’t touch the evidence the
police generate, the police won’t bother generating it. Perhaps that dynamic will
prevail in Montejo and Shatzer scenarios. Time will tell.144
VI. PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES FOR DEFENDANTS
Finally, will there be dire consequences as police and prosecutors put the new
cases into practice? Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent in Montejo that
“generations of police officers have been trained to refrain from approaching
represented defendants.”145
His point was simply that Jackson was not
“unworkable,” which is certainly true. Nor will Montejo prove “unworkable” as
successive police academy classes cut their teeth on its rule rather than Jackson’s.
The salient question is whether Montejo’s practical consequences will be significant
and bad.
141

See In re Gatti, 8 P.3d 966, 976 (Or. 2000).

142

See Lininger, supra note 128, at 1273-74; Gatti, 8 P.3d at 976. Lininger comments that
“for the two-year period in which ‘the Gatti rule’ remained in effect, proactive criminal
investigations ground to a halt in Oregon” and quotes a federal official publicly proclaiming
the rule’s effect: “F.B.I. Agent Nancy Savage, the Special Agent in Charge of the F.B.I. office
in Eugene, Oregon, commented on a national television broadcast that the Gatti rule had ‘shut
down major undercover operations’ in Oregon.” Lininger, supra note 128, at 1274-75.
143

Lininger, supra note 128, at 1274.

144

Richman illustrates this general dynamic with an example from Great Britain. A judge
dismissed a criminal charge in a case in which the police, unbeknownst to and unauthorized
by the prosecution, had promised immunity. The prosecution argued that the promise had
been made before any prosecutors were even involved with the investigation, but the High
Court was unmoved: “If the Crown Prosecution Service find that their powers are being
usurped by the police, the remedy must surely be a greater degree of liaison at an early stage.”
Richman, supra note 127, at 781 (quoting R. v. Croydon Justices ex rel. Dean, [1993] 3 All
E.R. 129, 135). And embroiling a prosecutor in an ethics investigation is far worse than
getting one case dismissed.
145

Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2098 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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On this question I am provisionally inclined to say no. It remains true that when
a suspect invokes his right to counsel in a Miranda setting, the police are obligated
to cease questioning, are trained to cease questioning, and generally do cease
questioning. And Edwards still bars re-initiation after invocation if the defendant
remains in custody. Montejo changes only the answer to the question whether the
police may still request a waiver when the suspect has not yet invoked, but has been
appointed counsel. It changes nothing substantively about the interaction between
the police and the defendant, and it is undisputed that the police already had the
authority to seek a post-arrest Miranda waiver, even if the suspect had already hired
a lawyer. So the practical effect will be only in situations where the defendant has
either already waived and made a statement, or has neither waived nor invoked
because the police have not yet had time to question him, and is, at the time of
appointment, willing to make further statements to the police, but would change his
mind if his attorney was present.
To be sure, this is not by any means a trivial set of defendants. Any competent
defense attorney will tell his client not to say anything, and not to say anything more
if he’s already made statements, until the attorney can assess the strength of the
government’s case. It is reasonable to think that some unknown but not insignificant
percentage of defendants who would otherwise have talked would decide to clam up
after being so advised by counsel. So the practical effect of Montejo is likely to be
to produce, at this margin, somewhat more confessions than would be produced by
the Jackson rule.
However, these are all confessions that by hypothesis would have been made
anyway but for an accident of timing—either the defendant had not yet been
interviewed at all, or he had but his statements were incomplete. In the former case,
the defendant in a Montejo scenario who does not want to talk need only do what
any pre-appointment defendant need do: invoke. In the latter case, the defendant has
already made the decision to waive and give a statement. So there is no new set of
defendants who will attempt to exercise their rights but will be unable to do so under
the new rule. In that respect, Montejo is perhaps less significant—and less
troubling—than cases like Butler146 and Davis,147 which did have the effect of
rendering some defendants’ attempts to invoke ineffective.
So the Montejo bottom line is likely to be that defendants who waive in a
Montejo setting would have waived pre-appointment too, as indeed Montejo himself
did. The result changes only for those defendants who would have been persuaded
by counsel not to waive. Are they being unfairly penalized by the Montejo rule, or
did they, rather, previously enjoy an unwarranted windfall under the Jackson rule?
Miranda itself suggests the latter interpretation, I think. After all, Miranda did not
hold that no custodial interrogation can take place without the suspect having a
lawyer present. The Court could have announced such a rule, but it has never done
so. The government, in short, gets one bite at the waiver apple and does not have to
go through counsel to get its bite. Every criminal suspect has to face the
waiver/invocation decision alone, once.

146
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) (recognizing implicit Miranda waiver
and declining to impose express waiver requirement).
147

Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (requiring express statement for invocation
of Miranda rights and declining to find implicit invocation).
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That, at least, was a fair statement of the law up until Shatzer, which adds: unless
the suspect is out of custody, in which case the suspect has to face the
waiver/invocation decision alone, once every two weeks, if he is re-arrested. Will
this holding create major upheaval? Again, I am inclined to doubt it. While the
suspect is free, there isn’t any custodial interrogation: The defendant out on bail can
walk away, or close his door, or say “No, thank you.”148 By definition, a defendant
out on bail has no Edwards protections: The police can always approach him and ask
whether he wants to talk. Edwards only barred re-initiation of custodial
interrogation. So for Shatzer to apply, a defendant has to be released and then, after
two weeks, re-arrested for something else. That’s not an unheard-of occurrence, to
be sure, but it certainly doesn’t happen in the majority of criminal cases.
Furthermore, in the Shatzer situation, we have a defendant who knows his rights,
has been told his rights not just by the police, but by a judge, and subsequently
(presumably) by his own attorney. It would be absurd to describe a Shatzer
defendant who waived on a second or third custodial contact as being unaware of his
right not to talk to the police: First, he has to be re-Mirandized, and second, by
hypothesis this person has been arrested, was Mirandized, invoked, had an initial
appearance, got a lawyer, made bail, and then was released. His own experience has
just proved that you can invoke and the invocation will be honored: By hypothesis
this person has already resisted the inherent coerciveness of custodial interrogation.
And the Shatzer court emphasized that Edwards continues to prohibit badgering.149
As long as the regular biweekly arrests are based on probable cause, then they’re
unlikely to be found to be badgering under Whren.150 Of course, the claim could be
made—but the point is that in such a scenario, the proper target of the defendant’s
ire would be Whren, not Shatzer.
So, as a purely predictive matter, I don’t think the sky will fall here for
defendants. I think Jackson was a workable rule but Montejo will be too. And I
don’t think that putting a time limit on Edwards for non-custodial defendants will
have significant impacts on investigations. Its impact on the relationship between
police and prosecutors, however, could be significant.
VII. CONCLUSION
As noted above, there’s a very strong argument that the no-contact rule is too
close to the heart of legal ethics for Montejo/Shatzer contacts to be permissible. The
rule is central to the professional identity of every lawyer, and rightly so: Channeling
communications through the lawyers is the only way to make any litigation work.
Criminal practice is no exception. Overtly contacting a represented, opposing party
148

I say all this with a full awareness of the hollowness of much of the Court’s consent
jurisprudence and the strong criticisms thereof made by David Cole and many others. See,
e.g., DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 17-22 (1999) (criticizing the Court’s consent cases). Still, the sharpest criticism of the
consent cases is that consent may be found even where the suspect did not know he had the
right to refuse the search request. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
However much contemporary interrogation jurisprudence has chipped away at Miranda’s
foundations, it remains true that no admissible custodial interrogation can proceed absent the
suspect’s knowledge of the right not to participate.
149

See, e.g., Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1220.

150

Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
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and asking him to talk to you without his attorney present might just be too much for
any court to countenance.151
If so, the question arises about the best administrative and legislative response.
Richman argues that, in some contexts, judicial enforcement of strong constructive
agency presumptions can have salutary results:
Those states that treat police and prosecutors as independent actors in the
plea agreement context would do well to reconsider a framework that
seems blind to the virtues of coordination within the enforcement
bureaucracy. Here again, as we saw in the Brady context, treating the
“government” as a single unit when it comes to defendants’ rights makes
it more likely that enforcers will productively collaborate.152
I’ve gone back and forth on this a bit, but I think I am now settled on the view
that the no-contact rule is too integral to the practice of law to be discarded in
Montejo/Shatzer contexts. I do not think courts will or should extend the exception
for undercover contacts to Montejo/Shatzer contacts without legislative revision of
the rules.
The rationale for allowing prosecutorial supervision of pre-attachment
undercover investigations makes sense: First, pre-attachment, it’s not necessarily
clear153 what the “subject matter of the representation” is—the defendant may
suspect that he’s a target, but has no way of knowing what he’ll ultimately be
charged with. Second, the type of contact at issue—“false friend” contact by an
informant or an agent posing as a co-conspirator—is not the kind of contact
contemplated by the no-contact rule.
Montejo/Shatzer contexts are different on both scores. There is a subject matter
of the representation—the defendant has been charged and has counsel representing
him on that charge. And while a cop’s request for a Miranda waiver is not “lawyerly
wiles” exactly, it’s surely closer to legalese than a conversation with someone you
think is just one of your conspirators.154 And it is hard to imagine a decision as to
which defense counsel’s advice is more valuable than the decision whether or not to
make a statement. Indeed, in my experience, the Miranda waiver decision is
functionally the decision about whether to plead.155
The simplest solution, doctrinally at any rate, would be for state legislatures to
revise the ethics rules to explicitly include Montejo/Shatzer contacts in the
“authorized by law” exception. I don’t think this is going to happen, however. So
the best option for prosecutors will be to insist that agents and officers not take
advantage of the Montejo/Shatzer holdings. Prosecutors should explain to their
151

See, e.g., State v. Miller, 600 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. 1999).

152

Richman, supra note 127, at 829-30.

153

Often, it is clear–—but this is a legal fiction, and my point is just that it’s at least
coherent in theory.
154

This is especially true when the officers say—as they are perfectly entitled to do—
things like: “If you have anything to tell us, this might be your only chance.”
155

To be sure, some defendants waive, make a statement denying guilt, then go to trial, but
that’s relatively rare. Usually the ones that go to trial invoke, and the ones that talk plead.
This is, I’ve always imagined, one of the biggest frustrations (among many) of defense
practice: Often, your client has already confessed by the time you’re appointed.
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agents and officers that any investigative activity ultimately aimed at proving a
suspect’s guilt in court is potentially, and reasonably, chargeable to the prosecutor.
Since the prosecutor is the one who will ultimately have to take responsibility for the
agents’ conduct, the agents should not violate the no-contact rule. And in order to
credibly rebut allegations of sub rosa encouragement of the practice, prosecutors
should announce—and follow—a policy of not using statements obtained in
violation of the rule.156

156

Indeed, DOJ did this preemptively in its Montejo brief, in which it stated that regardless
of the Montejo holding, federal agents would not interview suspects in Montejo scenarios. See
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Overruling Michigan v. Jackson at
11-12, Montejo, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (No. 07-1529), 2009 WL 1019983.
[A]lthough federal law enforcement agents generally are not constrained by the ethical
rules that apply to prosecutors, law enforcement interests are not well-served when
law enforcement agents have an incentive to communicate with represented
defendants without direction from prosecutors. Accordingly, even if this Court were
to overrule Jackson, that decision likely would not significantly alter the manner in
which federal law enforcement agents investigate indicted defendants.
Id.
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